

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/W

SUBJECT : NIOs and the NFAC

This is an unsolicited -- and perhaps undesired -- memo on the subject of NIOs and their relationship to the NFAC. It is written in the hope that a relatively unspoiled outlook may be of some value to you.

The Problem: As I see it, the problem is composed of two parts: the NIOs' mission and their place in the structure.

- They have become production managers of NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, et al.
- As a result, they are mired in detail.
- They have no real authority over the line analysts.
- Yet they need the support of those analysts.
- But the analysts work for the production elements.
- So we have friction between the NIOs and production element chiefs, paranoid analysts who are trying to serve two masters, and NIOs with lots of responsibility but little authority.
- Furthermore, with both functional and geographic NIOs, intelligence topics become fragmented:
 - How can an NIO for the USSR or China not be responsible for general purpose forces?
 - Or strategic forces?

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-- Where does the meld of political, economic, and
military intelligence take place?

A Proposed Mission: In general, the NIOs should be removed from the NFAC organization, subordinated to a senior NIO, reduced in number, and tasked to perform as the DCI's ambassador, at large, within both the intelligence and policy communities. They should keep their fingers on the pulse of substance, policy, and requirements through constant liaison with intelligence producers and users. They should identify needs for NIEs, IIMs, etc., serve as catalysts to get them scheduled, advise in their production (to make sure they will answer our ↓ Customers' needs), and then sell the product.

They should have:

- No tasking authority.
- No production responsibility.

How to Get There: (This section should be read in conjunction with the accompanying wiring diagram.) A number of changes are required to get the NIOs on track.

1. Establish a Production Management Office under D/NFA.

This office would take care of the mechanics of NIE/SNIE production; i.e., obtaining approval of concepts, coordinating terms of reference, assigning drafters, coordination, etc. The NIOs would advise this office, but would be freed of their present management responsibilities.

2. Establish a Senior NIO who would be co-equal to D/NFA and report to the DCI (or DDCI).

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3. Reduce the number of NIOs to six: USSR-EE, NESA, AF, LA, WE, and Asia (all of Asia not covered by USSR and NESA). Give the NIO/USSR-EE two fairly senior assistants, one political and one military; limit the remainder to one junior assistant. (This should help them resist the temptation to revert to the forest-trees syndrome.)

4. Have the Senior NIO retain the warning account.

5. Establish (if he feels it necessary) a special projects office under the D/NFA to handle those accounts now under the functional NIOs.

How It Might Work: I would foresee the system working something like this:

- The NIO/X, in conversations with Policymaker Y, perceives the need for an IIM on Z.
- He convinces the Senior NIO that his cause is just, and perhaps provides a rough outline of the salient points.
- The Senior NIO informs D/NFA of the requirement, and they negotiate details.
- D/NFA tasks the Production Management Office, OPA, OSR, et al to produce the IIM, maintaining close coordination with the NIO/X and following the rough outline provided by the Senior NIO.
- While the paper is being written, the NIO/X keeps an eye on it to ensure it is honest, representative, pertinent, and timely.


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- When the IIM is finished, the NIO/X becomes its principal salesman. He ensures that the proper people are briefed and that their reactions are noted.

Summary: The foregoing proposal would accomplish a number of things.

It would:

- Establish clear lines of responsibility and authority.
- Put production back where it belongs.
- Free the NIOs to perform as they were intended.
- Make the primacy of warning clear to all.



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